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PROTECTING THOSE WHO CANNOT PROTECT THEMSELVES:
STATE LIABILITY FOR VIOLATION OF FOSTER CHILDREN'S
RIGHT TO SAFETY
Christine M. Dine'
I. INTRODUCTION
Four-year-old foster child, John Smith, described as a "bright and fun-
loving child," was killed by his foster parents after months of abuse.' Al-
though social workers visited the home twenty times in the six months pre-
ceding and saw a "catalogue of wounds," including bums on his face and a
cut on his penis, they did nothing to protect John.2 Instead they accepted the
foster parents' assertions that the wounds were all self-inflicted.' John died
from "severe head injuries.'" Furthermore, an autopsy showed fifty-four
"separate external injuries, including bruising to the face, head, arms, legs
and back, as well as four human bite marks."' John's foster parents were sen-
tenced to prison for eight years for child cruelty.6 Neither foster parent was
charged with murder or manslaughter because investigators were unable to
determine who struck the fatal blow."
John is not alone. Another child in foster care was physically assaulted,
and the state knew of the assault and did nothing A short time later, in the
same home, the foster father sexually abused the child.! A little boy placed in
a foster home had a bedwetting problem. Although the foster mother asked
the state for help, the state did nothing, and one night the situation got so bad
that the foster mother forced the child to drink his own urine." Another fos-
* J.D. Candidate 2002, California Western School of Law; B.A. (Sociology), Tu-
lane University, 2000.
1. Geoff Maynard, Jailed, Foster Parents Who Killed Boy, DAILY EXS, Oct. 23,
2001, available at 2001 WL 29598476.
2. I.
3. Id.
4. Id
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id
8. Michael B. Mushlin, Unsafe Havens: The Case for Constitutional Protection of Foster
Children From Abuse and Neglect, 23 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 199, 200 (1988).
9. Id
10. Id
11. Id
1
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ter mother whipped a four-year-old girl and forced her to stand with her
hands over her head for thirty minutes as a punishment for being dirty.'" A
caseworker knew the child had been beaten and reported the observation to
her superiors, however the child was returned to the home.'3
To stop these atrocities from perpetuating, children need to be able to
vindicate their rights that are violated. Allowing them to do so would influ-
ence the state to increase efforts to provide a safe environment for the chil-
dren because the state, through the child welfare agency, removes the chil-
dren from their homes and places them in foster care. In order to prevail in
an action against the state agency for violation of the constitutional right to
safety, the child is faced with several burdens. One burden is that the child
must live within a circuit allowing a cause of action by a foster child against
the state for violation of his or her constitutional right to safety. In fact, one
author refers to foster children as the "most powerless political group in this
country."'" No single uniform standard resolves the issue of a foster child's
constitutional right to safety, and, to date, the Supreme Court has not ad-
dressed the issue.
First this paper briefly reviews the known rates of abuse of children in
foster care. Next, the development of the Constitutional right to safety is re-
viewed. Third, this paper reviews the Supreme Court's decision in DeShaney
v. Winnebago County Department of Social Services5 and its effect on the
issue, followed by a review of conflicting decisions by Circuit courts in rec-
ognizing a constitutional right to safety and a cause of action under 42
U.S.C. § 1983 for violation of that right. Fourth, different standards used by
the circuits that recognize a constitutional cause of action are presented.
Next, the need for the Supreme Court to address and clarify the constitu-
tional issue is discussed. A proposition is asserted that there should be a re-
buttable presumption of state agency liability for violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment to the United States Constitution substantive due process right
to safety when a foster child sustains injuries as a result of abuse by his or
her foster parents. Specifically discussed are the distinction between volun-
tary and involuntary placement, a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for
violation of the constitutional right to safety, the issue of foster parents as
state actors, whether foster care constitutes state custody, and the standard to
be used in determining if a violation of the foster child's constitutional right
to safety occurred. Finally the paper closes with a challenge to the Supreme
Court to take the responsibility and initiative to protect foster children from
the perpetuation of abuse by establishing a rebuttable presumption that the
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Cristina Chi-Young Chou, Special Project: Renewing the Good Intention of Foster
Care: Enforcement of the Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980 and the Sub-
stantive Due Process Right to Safety, 46 VAND. L. REv. 683, 687 (1993).
15. DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Social Services, 489 U.S. 189 (1989).
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state did not exercise professional judgment when the foster child's right to
safety was violated while in a foster home.
IT. THE STATE OF ABUSE OF CHILDREN IN FOSTER CARE
Children in foster care are left in extremely vulnerable positions.'6 They
are under the control of and often subject to abuse by their foster parents."
Usually the state agency removed the children from the custody of their par-
ents due to abuse or neglect." The rationale behind removing children from
their homes is that such a move is necessary to protect the children.'9 The
state receives authority to remove children from their abusive or neglecting
homes under the doctrine of parens patriae and doing so serves the societal
interest of protecting children." Given that the state exercises its authority to
establish a child welfare system and removes children from their homes, it
follows that the state should assume the responsibility of ensuring that the
child welfare system is competently administered.2' Placement in an abusive
foster home may subject children to abuse similar to that for which they
were originally removed; this risk is clearly counter-productive to the goal of
protecting children.'
The number of children at risk for abuse due to their placement in the
foster care system is alarming. In March 1999, 547,000 children were re-
ported to be in foster care, representing a thirty-five percent increase from
1990.' The rates of abuse and neglect of children in foster care is unknown,
but "the problem is more widespread than is currently acknowledged.""4 In
New York City a study reported that children in foster care were one and
one-half times more likely to suffer abuse and neglect than children in the
general population." A 1986 national survey of foster family abuse and ne-
glect exposed rates of abuse of foster children that were up to ten times that
of children in the general population.' After accounting for unreported or
16. Mushlin, supra note 8, at 214.
17. Id
18. Brendan P. Kearse, Abused Again: Competing Constitutional Standards for the
State's Duty to Protect Foster Children, 29 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROBs. 385. 385 (1996).
19. Id at 407.
20. Kristen L. Davenport, Due Process-Claims of Abused Children Against State Pro-
tective Agencies-The State's Responsibility After DeShaney v. Winnebago County Depart-
ment of Social Services, 19 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 243, 246-47 (1991).
21. Il at 247.
22. Kearse, supra note 18, at 385.
23. CHILDREN's DEFENSE FUND, CHILD ABUSE AND NEGL.ECT, FOSTER CARE, AND
ADOPTION: CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLEcT FACT SHEET at http://www.childrcnsdefense.org
/sschildabuse.htm (last visited Feb. 11, 2002) (citing CHILDREN's BUREAU,
ADMINISTRATION FOR CHILDREN AND FAMIu!ES, U.S. DEPARTM, ENT OF HEALTH AND HUuAN
SERvIcEs, THE AFCARS REPORT, CURRENT ESTIMATES AS OF JANUARY 2000 (2000)).
24. Mushlin, supra note 8, at 205.
25. Id. at 206.
26. Ied
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uninvestigated instances of foster care abuse and neglect, one study con-
cluded that "forty-three percent of children studied had been placed in an un-
suitable foster home, and that fifty-seven percent ... were at serious risk of
harm while in foster care."27 A Baltimore study of foster care abuse based on
social services' own records revealed that out of 149 cases, forty-two chil-
dren (twenty-eight percent) had been abused while in foster care.2"
III. HISTORY OF THE ISSUE
The issue of state liability for violation of foster children's right to
safety is not new. The litigation dates as far back as 1981, when the Second
Circuit issued a decision in Doe v. New York City Dep't of Social Services."
Since then, the Supreme Court issued the decision in DeShaney v. Winne-
bago County Dep't of Social Services,3 but did not resolve the issue. Con-
flict has developed between the circuits over the issue of liability and in
those circuits that have recognized liability, the courts have applied conflict-
ing standards to determine liability.
A. Right To Safety
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitu-
tion asserts that no state shall "deprive any person of life, liberty, or prop-
erty, without due process of law... ."" Among other things, the Due Process
Clause protects an individual's right to be free from unjustified intrusions on
personal security.32 Encompassed in this protection is the right to be free
from bodily restraint and punishment.33 Although the language of the Due
Process clause prohibits state action infringing upon rights, the Supreme
Court has held that, in some circumstances, it imposes an affirmative duty on
the state to protect rights.3"
27. Id. at 207.
28. BRENDA SCOTT, OUT OF CONTROL: WHO'S WATCHING OUR CHILD PROTECTION
AGENCIES 112 (1994).
29. Doe v. New York City Dep't of Social Services, 649 F.2d 134, 145 (2d Cir. 1981)
(holding that a foster child may have a § 1983 cause of action against the state for violation of
the right to safety when the state's conduct amounted to deliberate indifference to abuse by
the foster parent).
30. DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Social Services, 489 U.S. 189, 198 (1989)
(finding no constitutional cause of action by a child against the state for violation of the con-
stitutional right to safety when that child is in the custody of the natural parent who caused the
death or injury).
31. Specifically the text reads: "[N]or shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty,
or property, without due process of law .... U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
32. Chou, supra note 14, at 705.
33. Id.
34. Id. (citing Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976) and Youngberg v. Romeo, 429 U.S.
307 (1982)).
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Legal scholars acknowledged the right to safety by as early as the sev-
enteenth century.' Just recently, the right to safety belonging to institutional-
ized persons has been recognized as an enforceable constitutional right.' The
enforceability of the right to safety emerged in the courts in the context of a
prison setting.' While at least one court believed that the government had an
affirmative duty to protect inmates from assault or injury, the "hands-off
doctrine" barred enforcement of the right to safety." Under the judicially
created hands-off doctrine, federal courts were prohibited from reviewing
prison matters.39 However, in response to the Supreme Court's receptivity to
civil rights cases in the late 1960s and early 1970s, courts began to step
away from the prohibition of judicial review of institutional conditions. ' The
Supreme Court overruled the hands-off doctrine in 1974." Following the re-
pudiation of that doctrine, lower courts established an inmate's right to
safety in prison, finding that the right protects inmates from abuse by guards
and from conditions where inmates may be abused by other inmates.' In ad-
dition to recognizing a constitutional right to safety on the part of prison in-
mates,43 the Court has also held that residents of state mental institutions
possess the same constitutional right." Specifically, in Youngberg, the Court
held that the "state owes an 'unquestioned duty' to provide reasonable safety
for all residents of a state institution for the mentally retarded."
Although the Supreme Court has recognized the right to safety only in
the context of prisons and mental institutions, lower courts have extended
the principle to a variety of other situations. ' One example is White v.
Rochford.'3 In that case three young children were in a car driven by an uncle
of two of the children when the police stopped the car and arrested the uncle
35. Mushlin, supra note 8, at 218 (citing T. HOBBS, LEvIATHAN (1651). 4 Co. Rep. I
(K.B. 1608), and 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COiMNTARIES 129 (1780)).
36. Mushlin, supra note 8, at 219 (citing Jackson v. Bishop, 404 F.2d 571, 579 (8th Cir.
1968), Holt v. Sarver, 309 F. Supp. 362 (E.D. Ark. 1970), and Woodhous v. Virginia, 487
F.2d 889, 890 (4th Cir. 1973)).
37. Mushlin, supra note 8, at 219.
38. Id. (citing Coffin v. Reichard, 143 F.2d 443 (6th Cir. 1944)).
39. Mushlin, supra note 8, at 219 (citing Ex parte Pickens, 101 F. Supp, 285, 287. 290
(D. Alaska 1951) and United States ex rel. Morris v. Radio Station WENR. 209 F.2d 105 (7th
Cir. 1953)).
40. Mushlin, supra note 8, at 219 (citing Jackson v. Bishop, 404 F.2d 571, 579 (8th Cir.
1968), Holt v. Sarver, 309 F. Supp. 362 (E.D. Ark. 1970), and Woodhous v. Virginia. 487
F.2d 889, 890 (4th Cir. 1973)).
41. Mushlin, supra note 8, at 220 (citing Wolff v. McDonnell. 418 U.S. 539, 555-56
(1973)).
42. Mushlin, supra note 8, at 220 (citing Hoptowit v. Ray, 682 F.2d 1237. 1250 (9th Cir.
1982), and Little v. Walker, 552 F.2d 193 (7th Cir. 1977)).
43. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976).
44. Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307 (1982).
45. Mushlin, supra note 8, at 217-18.
46. Id. at 226.
47. 592 F.2d 381 (7th Cir. 1979).
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for drag racing. 8 Disregarding the uncle's pleas that the children be taken to
the police station or a phone booth, the police left the children alone in the
car on the side of a busy, limited-access highway. 9 The children were forced
to cross eight lanes of traffic and walk along the freeway at night to call their
mother." The mother, having no vehicle available to look for and pick up the
children, called the police who again refused to help.5' The Seventh Circuit
found that leaving the children in such a position of danger was a violation
of the children's right to safety. 2 However the Supreme Court has not ad-
dressed the issue of a child's right to safety in foster care.
B. DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of Social Services 3
In 1989, the United States Supreme Court issued the ruling of DeShaney
v. Winnebago County Department of Social Services,' holding that the state
had no constitutional duty to protect a child from abuse by his father, even if
the state had received reports of possible abuse and had subsequently inves-
tigated.55 In DeShaney, the Department of Social Services received allega-
tions of abuse of plaintiff Joshua DeShaney by his father beginning when the
child was approximately two years old.56 For the next two years the Depart-
ment of Social Services investigated and substantiated the allegations, going
so far as to remove Joshua from his father's home for a short time. 7 Al-
though there was substantial evidence of the abuse continuing after Joshua
was returned to his father's home, the Department of Social Services took no
action other than monthly visits to the home. 8 When Joshua was four, his fa-
ther beat him severely, causing substantial brain damage. 9 As a result,
Joshua is expected to remain in an institution for the profoundly retarded for
the remainder of his life.'
Joshua and his mother brought an action against the Department of So-
cial Services under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging the Department's failure to
act deprived Joshua of liberty, in violation of the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.6' The Supreme Court found no violation, reasoning
that Joshua was in his father's custody, his father inflicted the abuse and the
48. Id. at 382.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 383-86.
53. DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Social Services, 489 U.S. 189 (1989).
54. Id.
55. Id. at 191.
56. Id. at 192.
57. Id. at 192-93.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 193.
60. Id.
61. Id.
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father's acts did not constitute state action.' Accordingly, the Court found
that the state had in no way limited Joshua's ability to act on his own behalf,
and only such an affirmative limitation would trigger the protection of the
Due Process Clause.' The opinion did not state whether foster care would
constitute such a limitation. However, the Court addressed the issue in a
footnote:
Had the State by the affirmative exercise of its power removed Joshua from free
society and placed him in a foster home operated by its agents, we might have a
situation sufficiently analogous to incarceration or institutionalization to give rise
to an affirmative duty to protect. Indeed, several Courts of Appeals have held. by
analogy to Estelle and Youngberg, that the State may be held liable under the Due
Process Clause for failing to protect children in foster homes from mistreatment at
the hands of their foster parents.... We express no view on the validity of this
analogy, however, as it is not before us in the present case. 
6
This comment by the Court has spurred a great deal of legal debate over
the issue of state liability under the Due Process Clause of the Constitution
for failure to protect foster children from abuse by foster parents.
C. Conflict of Circuits
The decisions as to this issue have varied between circuits based on dif-
fering rationales. The Second, Third, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, Tenth, and
Eleventh Circuits recognize a constitutional right to safe foster care place-
ment and allow a cause of action against the state.' Specifically, the Sixth
Circuit held that "due process extends the right to be free from the infliction
of unnecessary harm to children in state-regulated foster homes." The Sev-
enth Circuit clarifies the existence of a constitutional "prima facie right not
to be placed with a foster parent who the state's caseworkers and supervisors
know or suspect is likely to abuse or neglect the foster child." The Tenth
Circuit held that foster children in the state's legal custody placed in a foster
home or institution were victims of violence under state control, and found a
62. Id. at 201.
63. Id. at 200.
64. Id. at 201, n.9 (citations omitted). The court cites cases from two circuits finding that
the state may be held liable for failure to protect children: Doe v. New York City Dep't of So-
cial Services, 649 F.2d 134 (2d Cir. 1981), after remand, 709 F.2d 782, and Taylor ex rel.
Walker v. Ledbetter, 818 F.2d 791 (11th Cir. 1987) (en banc). DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 201,
n.9.
65. Doe v. New York City Dep't of Social Services, 649 F.2d 134 (2d Cir. 1981); Nicini
v. Morra, 212 F.3d 798 (3d Cir. 2000); Meador v. Cabinet for Human Res., 902 F.2d 474 (6th
Cir. 1990); K.H. ex rel. Murphy v. Morgan, 914 F.2d 846 (7th Cir. 1990); Norfleet v. Arkan-
sas Dep't of Human Services, 989 F.2d 289 (8th Cir. 1993); Yvonne L. v. New Mexico Dep't
of Human Services, 959 F.2d 883 (10th Cir. 1992); and Taylor ex rel. Walker v. Ledbetter,
818 F.2d 791 (llth Cir. 1987).
66. Meador v. Cabinet for Human Res., 902 F.2d 474, 476 (6th Cir. 1990). quoted in
Lintz v. Skipski, 25 F.3d 304, 305 (6th Cir. 1994).
67. K.H. ex reL Murphy v. Morgan, 914 F.2d 846, 853 (7th Cir. 1990) (emphasis added).
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sufficient special relationship that may confer state liability.68 Furthermore,
the Eighth Circuit found that the state had a duty to provide for the safety of
a child in a foster home.'
Conversely, the First, Fourth, and Ninth Circuits addressed the issue dif-
ferently. In Milburn v. Anne Arundel County Dep't of Social Services, the
Fourth Circuit held that children voluntarily placed in state custody do not
have a constitutional cause of action against the state for violation of a right
to safety because the state had not affirmatively exercised power to restrain
the child's liberty." The court also found that the foster parents were not
considered state actors." Furthermore, in 1997, the Fourth Circuit clarified
that the Milburn holding, finding no constitutional cause of action, was not
limited to voluntary placement.72 The Ninth Circuit addressed the issue in
Babcock v. Tyler, finding that state workers, including the child welfare
agency, are entitled to absolute immunity from liability for placement in an
abusive foster home.
73
Among decisions recognizing a cause of action for violation of the con-
stitutional right to safety emerge two different standards courts use to deter-
mine liability: deliberate indifference and professional judgment. The Sec-
ond and Eleventh Circuit adopted the deliberate indifference standard
applied by the Supreme Court in Estelle v. Gamble." To find deliberate in-
difference, the action that is being challenged should "offend 'evolving stan-
dards of decency' and should be "repugnant to the conscience of man-
kind."7 In Doe v. New York City Dep't of Social Services, the Second Circuit
found the custodial situation of children in foster care sufficiently similar to
that of the prisoners in Estelle.76 The Court held the inaction of the state to
abuse it knew of, or should have known of, which reaches the level of delib-
erate indifference, similarly gives rise to a cause of action under § 1983.
The Eleventh Circuit analogized the situation of children in foster care to the
68. T.M. v. Carson, 93 F. Supp. 2d 1179, 1184 (D. Wyo. 2000) (citing Yvonne L. v. New
Mexico Dep't of Human Services, 959 F.2d 883, 893 (10th Cir. 1992)).
69. Karen M. Blum, DeShaney: Custody, Creation of Danger, and Culpability, 27 LoY.
L.A. L. REV. 435, 440 (1994) citing Norfleet v. Arkansas Dep't of Human Services, 989 F.2d
at 293 (8th Cir. 1993).
70. Milburn v. Anne Arundel County Dep't of Social Services, 871 F.2d 474, 476 (4th
Cir. 1989).
71. Id. at 478.
72. White v. Chambliss, 112 F.3d 731, 737-38 (4th Cir. 1997).
73. Babcock v. Tyler, 884 F.2d 497, 503-04 (9th Cir. 1989), cited in Daniel L. Skoler, A
Constitutional Right to Safe Foster Care?-Time for the Supreme Court to Pay Its L 0. U., 18
PEPP. L. REV. 353, 360 (1991).
74. 429 U.S. 97, 104-06 (1976) (finding that deliberate indifference to serious medical
needs of prisoners may give rise to a constitutional cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983).
75. Id. at 105-06.
76. Doe v. New York City Dep't of Social Services, 649 F.2d 134, 143 (1981).
77. Id.
[Vol. 38
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situation of prisoners in Estelle and concurred with the deliberate indiffer-
ence standard set forth by the Second Circuit."
Conversely, other courts, including the Seventh and Tenth Circuits,
have followed the professional judgment standard set forth in Youngberg v.
Romeo.79 The professional judgment standard inquires as to "whether the de-
fendants' conduct was 'such a substantial departure from accepted profes-
sional judgment, practice, or standards in the care and treatment of this
plaintiff as to demonstrate that the defendants did not base their conduct on a
professional judgment."'" The Seventh Circuit found that proper exercise of
professional judgment in the placement of children in foster homes may pro-
tect child welfare workers and their supervisors from liability.8 ' The Tenth
Circuit questions the existence of a difference between the two standards,
but chooses to follow the professional judgment standard and interprets it to
imply "abdication of the duty to act professionally in making the place-
ments."- 8
Since the DeShaney decision in 1989, the Supreme Court has denied
certiorari in cases brought by foster children to enforce constitutional
rights.' The continued conflict between the circuits, and the perpetuation of
legal discourse addressing the issue of state agency liability for violation of
foster children's constitutional right to safety, advance the need for resolu-
tion by the Supreme Court. Moreover, legal scholars advocated for such a
right even prior to the decision in DeShaney.'
IV. PROPOSED SOLUTION
In response to the persisting conflict between the circuits concerning the
issue of a right to safe foster care, coupled with the continued incidence of
abuse of foster children at the hands of foster parents, the Supreme Court
should grant certiorari for a case presenting this issue. The Court should es-
tablish a universal standard. The solution proposed here is as follows:
78. Taylor v. Ledbetter, 818 F.2d 791, 796-97 (1987).
79. 457 U.S. 307, 321-22 (1982).
80. Id at 314 (citing Romeo v. Youngberg, 644 F.2d 147, 178 (3d Cir. 1980)).
81. KH. ex rel. Murphy v. Morgan, 914 F.2d 846, 854 (7th Cir. 1990).
82. Yvonne L. v. New Mexico Dep't of Human Services, 959 F.2d 883, 894 (10th Cir.
1992).
83. Arlene E. Fried, The Foster Child's Avenues of Redress: Questions Left Unanswered,
26 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 465, 479 (1993) (citing Meador v. Cabinet for Human Res..
902 F.2d 474 (6th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 867 (1990); Eugene D. v. Karman, 889
F.2d 701 (6th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 496 U.S. 931 (1990); Milburn v. Anne Arundel County
Dep't of Social Services, 871 F.2d 474 (4th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 850 (1989); and
L.J. v. Massinga, 838 F.2d 118 (4th Cir. 1988), on remand, 699 F. Supp. 508 (D. Md. 1988),
cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1018 (1989)).
84. Douglas D. SeIph, Taylor v. Ledbetter: Vindicating the Constitutional Rights of Fos-
ter Children to Adequate Care and Protection, 22 GA. L. REv. 1187. 1194 (Summer 1988).
9
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1. The standard that should be applied in determining whether the
foster child's constitutional right to safety was violated is the
professional judgment standard, as opposed to the deliberate in-
difference standard; and
2. When a foster child is abused or neglected by a foster parent, a
rebuttable presumption that the state did not exercise profes-
sional judgment should exist in an action by the foster child for
state liability under 42 U.S.C. §1983 for violation of the child's
constitutional right to safety.85
A. Voluntary Versus Involuntary Placement
Different standards have been used in determining state liability for vio-
lation of a constitutional right to safety. One of the issues that affect stan-
dards is whether the placement of the child in foster care was voluntary or
involuntary. A rationale for this distinction is present in Milburn, question-
ing whether the state, through an affirmative exercise of power, restrained
the child's liberty.86 Voluntary placement does not require an affirmative ex-
ercise of state power.87 A "large segment" of foster children are voluntarily
placed.88 Voluntary placement is based on the parent's consent to placement
and not on the child's.
A voluntary placement occurs when the parents have consented to a
placement by the state. 89 Consent occurs "when physical or mental illness,
economic problems or other family crises make it impossible for parents...
to provide a stable home life for their children." The placement may follow
a state investigation into the home or a parent may seek government assis-
tance.9 The distinction between voluntary and involuntary placement is sig-
nificant as a result of the Court's holding in Youngberg, which limited a con-
stitutional cause of action to those individuals who had been involuntarily
institutionalized.' This distinction should not control, however, because fos-
ter care placement is not voluntary for the child even if the parent consented.
Moreover, it has been asserted that the "children themselves have no more
choice about placement than an involuntarily committed prisoner or mental
85. For purposes of this Comment, the liability discussion concerns liability of the state
through liability of the state child welfare agency. Therefore, for purposes of this Comment,
reference to "the state" includes both the state as a sovereign entity and the state child welfare
agency as a direct branch of the state.
86. Milburn, 871 F.2d at 476.
87. Fried, supra note 83, at 487 (citing Michael B. Mushlin, Unsafe Havens: The Case
for Constitutional Protection of Foster Children from Abuse and Neglect, 23 IARV. C.R.-C.L.
L. Rav. 199, 237 (1988)).
88. See Fried, supra note 83, at 487.
89. Mushlin, supra note 8, at 237-38.
90. Id. at 238 (citing Smith v. OFFER, 431 U.S. 816, 824 (1977).
91. Id.
92. Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 321-22 (1982).
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patient." 3 When a foster child is abused or neglected by foster parents, it is
the child's rights that are being violated, not the rights of the parents. Ac-
cordingly, the issue of consent to placement by the parents should not condi-
tion the implication of the child's rights.
One author asserts that voluntarily placed children should be afforded
the same constitutional right to safety as involuntarily placed children. ' The
author questions the extent to which "voluntary placement" is actually vol-
untary.95 Parents who voluntarily relinquish their child to the state may feel
that there is no other alternative and may believe that they are acting in the
best interests of their child. This may occur because the parents, although
exemplary in every other respect, may not be financially able to attend to the
child's needs.' Low-income parents are also less able than middle class
families to arrange for alternative care for their children outside of state as-
sistance.' Another possible scenario affecting the parents' consent may oc-
cur when the investigating social worker "threaten[s] the parent with the
permanent loss of the child unless there [is] 'consent' to temporary place-
ment."'9 If the parent fails to consent to placement and instead loses custody
in a child protection proceeding, the possibility of retaining parental rights is
"significantly diminished." These factors make the distinction between
"free choice" in placing their child and "unacceptable coercion" in placing
their child unclear. '' "® Furthermore, in voluntarily placing their child, most
parents would not expect to be placing their child into unsafe conditions.''
Additionally, the rights affected here are not the rights of the parent who
placed the child either voluntarily or involuntarily. Rather, the rights affected
are the constitutional rights of the child. These rights should not diminish
based on their parents' choice, or lack thereof, in placing the child. Children
placed voluntarily and involuntarily are in the exact same situation once
placed in a foster home in state custody.02 Just as children placed involuntar-
ily, children voluntarily placed in foster care may be completely dependant
on the state child welfare agency and yet receive less protection from that
agency." This distinction has a negative impact on the voluntarily placed
children by reducing their right to safe foster care placement. Conceivably,
no matter how severe abuse of the voluntarily placed foster child by his or
her foster parent is, with the state having full knowledge of the amount and
93. Mushlin, supra note 8, at 239.
94. Chou, supra note 14, at 708. See Laura Oren, DeShaney's Unfinished Business: The
Foster Child's Due Process Right to Safety, 69 N.C. L. REv. 113 (1990).
95. Chou, supra note 14, at 708-09.
96. Mushlin, supra note 8, at 239-40.
97. Id
98. Id. at 240.
99. Id
100. Id
101. Id.
102. Chou, supra note 14, at 708.
103. Fried, supra note 83, at 487.
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severity of the abuse, the child may have no remedy to stop the abuse. As a
result of differences between the rights of foster children placed voluntarily
and those placed involuntarily, an incentive exists for "a child to remain in a
parent's inadequate charge until the situation has deteriorated to the point
where the state will forcibly remove the child into its own custody," only
then implicating the child's constitutional right to safe foster care.' Accord-
ingly, the time has come for the Supreme Court to grant certiorari in a case
by a foster child against the state for violation of his or her constitutional
right to safety in the foster home setting, and to eliminate the voluntary and
involuntary distinction.
B. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Action
42 U.S.C. § 1983 allows civil action for deprivation of rights. Specifi-
cally, § 1983 sets forth that "every person who, under color of [law] ... sub-
jects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States ... to the
deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitu-
tion and laws, shall be liable to the party injured. .. ."" Because § 1983 con-
fers a statutory cause of action that may only be asserted against agencies or
individuals acting under authority of state law, the party against whom the
action is being brought must be a state actor. The Supreme Court, in both
Youngberg and Estelle, recognized a constitutional cause of action under §
1983 by prisoners and by patients in mental institutions, and as presented
above, several circuits have specifically recognized such a cause of action by
foster children placed in abusive foster homes."° The right at issue is the
right to safety conferred by the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitu-
tion."°
As stated previously, the Constitutional right to safety has been recog-
nized by the Supreme Court in the contexts of mental institutions' and pris-
ons."° Furthermore, the Supreme Court has promoted protection of children
by recognizing that children's safety and well being take precedence over
First Amendment rights of free speech" and freedom of religion.'" The Su-
104. Id. at 488.
105. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2001).
106. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976); Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307 (1982).
See Doe v. New York City Dep't of Social Services, 649 F.2d 134 (2d Cir. 1981), Nicini v.
Morra, 212 F.3d 798 (3d Cir. 2000), Meador v. Cabinet for Human Res., 902 F.2d 474 (6th
Cir. 1990), K.H. ex rel. Murphy v. Morgan, 914 F.2d 846 (7th Cir. 1990), Norflect v. Arkan-
sas Dep't of Human Services, 989 F.2d 289 (8th Cir. 1993), Yvonne L. v. New Mexico Dep't
of Human Services, 959 F.2d 883 (10th Cir. 1992), and Taylor ex rel. Walker v. Ledbetter,
818 F.2d 791 (1 1th Cir. 1987).
107. "[N]or shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law....U .S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
108. See Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 315-16. See also Mushlin, supra note 8, at 218-22.
109. See Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 687 (1978). See also Mushlin, supra note 8, at
218-22.
110. Davenport, supra note 20, at 248 (citing Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629
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preme Court has not directly decided the issue of a constitutional right to
safety in the foster home setting, but arguments exist in support of such a
right. The Supreme Court, in Youngberg, rationalized that "if it is... [un-
constitutional] to hold convicted criminals in unsafe conditions, it must be
unconstitutional to confine the involuntarily committed-who may not be
punished at all-in unsafe conditions."' . Surely a foster child's right to
safety should be no less than prisoners' or mental patients'. A child is not
placed in a foster home as punishment or because the child needs constant
medical treatment. The child needs a safe environment in which the child
can grow and develop.
Because the state, through removal of the child from the home and
placement of the child in the abusive or neglecting foster home, is responsi-
ble for placing the child in the environment where he or she is subjected to
abuse by foster parents, the state is the appropriate party against whom the
action should be brought. The state exercised its authority in taking the child
out of the home and placing him or her in the foster home. The blame, there-
fore, should lie at the feet of the state.
C. Foster Parents as State Actors and State Custody
Although it may seem rational to assume that children in foster care are
considered to be in state custody, such an assumption would be erroneous. In
Milburn, the Fourth Circuit found that the abusive foster parents were not
state actors because the alleged abuse was not coerced or encouraged by the
state.13 Furthermore, the court found "[tihe care of foster children is not tra-
ditionally the exclusive prerogative of the State.""' The previous statement is
not adequately supported with reasoning in the opinion. The court did not
say why the care of foster children is not the exclusive prerogative of the
state, but implied that because foster parents care for the children, the re-
sponsibility is removed from the state.' However, the responsibility remains
with the state. The state merely contracts with foster parents who then per-
form the state's responsibility of caring for the children.
Along a similar line, there is Supreme Court precedent regarding cus-
tody of foster children with habeas corpus claims. In Lehman v. Lycoming
County Children's Service Agency, the Supreme Court held that "foster chil-
dren are not in state custody for the purpose of obtaining a writ of habeas
(1968)).
111. Davenport, supra note 20, at 248 (citing Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158
(1944)).
112 Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 315-16.
113. Milburn v. Anne Arundel County Dep't of Social Services, 871 F.2d 474, 479 (4th
Cir. 1989).
114. Md
115. Id. at 476-79.
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corpus."" 6 That holding, however, is limited to habeas corpus cases and does
not preclude the possibility that foster children may be in state custody to as-
sert other constitutional rights."7 This conclusion is based on an analysis of
Lehman."' First, the Court stated, "[tihe 'custody' of foster or adoptive par-
ents over a child is not the type of custody that traditionally has been chal-
lenged through federal habeas."'"9 Furthermore, the Court limited the non-
custodial determination specifically to federal habeas cases, stating that "al-
though the children have been placed in foster homes pursuant to an order of
a Pennsylvania court, they are not in the 'custody' of the State in the sense in
which that term has been used by this Court in determining the availability
of the writ of habeas corpus.'
' 20
Although the Court has not addressed foster care as a form of state cus-
tody with respect to the constitutional right to safety, two decisions reflect
what requirements may be imposed to establish state custody. In DeShaney,
the Court discusses the state's affirmative control over the individual and the
resulting inability of the individual to care for himself or herself.2' Addition-
ally, in Youngberg, the Court discusses dependency of the individual on the
state for care and protection.'22
When a child is taken into protective custody, it is the responsibility of
the state agency that removes the child to find a place where care can be
provided to that child. The state may contract this responsibility to a private
company, but ultimately the child is removed from the home by the state un-
der state authority and placed in a foster home.' In an Illinois lawsuit filed
against the state for abuse of children in foster care, the state argued that "af-
ter removing the children from their own families where abuse was sus-
pected, the Department of Children and Family Services has no legal respon-
sibility whatsoever for their mental well-being." 2 This argument is
incongruous in that it fails to acknowledge the same responsibility the state
claims it has in initially removing the children from their homes. Addition-
ally, the state (Illinois) "only accepted responsibility for the physical welfare
of children placed in state institutions" leaving children in foster care "at
their own peril.' 2 ' This argument is also unfounded because the state con-
116. Kevin M. Ryan, Stemming the Tide of Foster Care Runaways: A Due Process Per-
spective, 42 CATH. U. L. REv. 271, 293 (1993) (citing Lehman v. Lycoming County Chil-
dren's Service Agency, 458 U.S. 502, 502 (1982)).
117. Ryan, supra note 115, at 295.
118. Id. at 294-95.
119. Lehman, 458 U.S. at 511 (cited in Ryan, supra note 115, at 294-95).
120. Ryan, supra note 115, at 295 (citing Lehman, 458 U.S. at 510).
121. DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Social Services, 489 U.S. 189, 199
(1989).
122. Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 317 (1982).
123. See, e.g., Smith v. Organization of Foster Families for Equality and Reform. 431
U.S. 816, 826 (1977).
124. ScoTr, supra note 28, at 111-12.
125. Id. at 112 (citing RICHARD WEXLER, WOUNDED INNOCENCE 193 (1990)).
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tinues to provide for the physical welfare of children in foster homes through
monthly support payments, continued monitoring of the home by a social
worker, the provision of services such as counseling, and control of the
child's present and future placement. Furthermore, the Milburn opinion as-
serts that the only relationship alleged between the state and the foster par-
ents arises from the contract the foster parents signed with the state child
welfare agency, the agency home approval of the foster parents, and child
abuse reporting statutes.'26 The court finds that such evidence does not so in-
sinuate the state "into a position of interdependence with the charged party
that it must be recognized as a joint participant in the challenged activity.'""
The Fourth Circuit fails to recognize that the charged party in the case is
not the foster parents, but rather the state itself. The child is not filing a
cause of action simply because he or she was abused by his or her foster par-
ents, but because the state, who placed the child in protective custody, con-
tinued placement of the child in the face of repeated suspicions of child
abuse by the foster parents.' The court focuses on whether the foster parents
were state actors in their perpetuation of abuse, rather than focusing on the
real issue of whether the state was remiss in its duty to monitor the place-
ment and continue placement of the child in that home in the face of suspi-
cions of abuse by the foster parents. Courts must avoid the web of confusion
in deciding whether foster parents are state actors, and should focus instead
on whether the state failed to protect the child entrusted in its custody.
The limited rights that foster parents possess with respect to control over
the foster child also gives support to the proposition that the state's responsi-
bility for the safety of the child continues after the child is placed in foster
care. Foster parents' rights with respect to foster children are limited.'" Fos-
ter parents are not given parental rights over the child. They are unable to
choose where the child lives. The state may remove the child from the foster
home regardless of the foster parents' wishes. The power the state retains
over the child and the ability of the state to regulate the foster family's inter-
action with that child supports the proposition that children in foster care, for
legal purposes, remain in state custody. Moreover, it is the inaction of the
state which gives rise to the cause of action, not simply the action of the fos-
ter parents in abusing the child. Placements of foster children should be
monitored to evaluate the placement and determine if the care being pro-
vided is adequate. If the care is not adequate, steps must be taken to locate a
placement that will provide sufficient care. For the foster child to retain a
cause of action against the state, the abuse or neglect of the child by the fos-
ter parents must be coupled with the state's inaction in response to known or
126. Milbum v. Anne Arundel County Dep't of Social Services. 871 F.2d 474, 477 (4th
Cir. 1989).
127. Id
128. ld at 475-76.
129. See, e.g., Smith v. Organization of Foster Families for Equality and Reform. 431
U.S. 816, 846 (1977).
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suspected abuse. Accordingly, the state should be liable because its inaction
or inadequate action caused the child to be subjected to abuse by the foster
parents.
D. Professional Judgment Standard
Professional judgment is the standard that should be applied in review-
ing whether the state agency is liable for violation of the constitutional right
to safety. Specifically, inquiry should be made into "whether the defendants'
conduct was 'such a substantial departure from accepted professional judg-
ment, practice, or standards in the care and treatment of this plaintiff as to
demonstrate that the defendants did not base their conduct on a professional
judgment.'"' 30 It has been questioned whether the professional judgment
standard is enough to provide children with the necessary protection. 3' But
to use the deliberate indifference standard would limit actual violations of
the law to only the most serious deprivations of the fight to safety.' Thus,
the deliberate indifference standard would provide insufficient protection to
children left completely at the mercy of the state and the foster parents. De-
liberate indifference, according to the Second Circuit, requires grossly negli-
gent or reckless conduct, but is not violated by simple negligence."' Deliber-
ate indifference, therefore, provides insufficient protection because it may be
simple negligence, rather than gross negligence, that results in the perpetua-
tion of abuse of a foster child by his or her foster parents.
Contributing to foster children's dependency on the state for care and
protection is the inability of children to communicate effectively or change
the situation into which they have been placed.' Children in the foster care
system are placed there without regard to the child's consent. The children
are removed from the home at the state's initiative or at the request of the
parents. The child must live in the homes selected by the state agency and
depend upon the state for protection.'33 Such dependency on the state bolsters
the argument for imposition of the professional judgment standard because
the state has complete control over the child's placement. Additionally, fail-
ure by the overburdened state agencies to exercise professional judgment is
intricately connected to the harming of children because the harm could be
prevented by the state's exercise of professional judgment.'
130. Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 314.
131. Kearse, supra note 18, at 387.
132. Selph, supra note 84, at 1195-96.
133. Id. at 1196 (citing Doe v. New York City Dep't of Social Services, 649 F.2d 134,
142 (2d Cir. 1983)).
134. Beth A. Diebel, Note: Mark G. v. Sabol: Substantive Due Process Rights: A Possi-
bility for Foster Care Children in New York, 64 ALB. L. REv. 823 (2000).
135. Id. at 1209.
136. Roger J.R. Levesque, The Failures of Foster Care Reform: Revolutionalizing the
Most Radical Blueprint, 6 MD. J. CONTEMI'. LEGAL ISSUES 1, 11 (1995).
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Although courts choose not to enunciate specific professional judgments
that should be used, professional standards include screening and licensing
of foster parents, training of foster parents, and continued, systematic super-
vision of the placement by caseworkers.'37 Mandating strict adherence to
similar standards would only lessen the likelihood of placement in an abu-
sive foster home and, consequently, would protect children from deprivation
of their constitutional right to safety. Furthermore, such requirements would
influence state workers to do their job correctly, and further the state's inter-
est in promoting efficient and effective state employees.
E. Rebuttable Presunption
A rebuttable presumption that the state did not exercise professional
judgment when a child was placed in an abusive or neglecting foster home
should exist for a variety of reasons. First, if the child is abused or neglected
while in foster care, something had to have gone wrong at some level,
whether it is that the state failed to thoroughly screen and monitor the foster
parents, that the foster parents were able to conceal their abusive propensity,
or some other problem. Second, children do not have the resources the state
has to pursue a lawsuit vindicating their rights. The state has attorneys who
are well practiced in the law as it concerns foster children. Children usually
do not have any form of income, the skills necessary to retain a lawyer, or
knowledge of their rights and subsequent remedies for violations of those
rights. They must rely on their parents for these things. However children in
foster care are unable to rely on their parents to assert their rights. The situa-
tion of the children against the state can be compared to that of parents
against the state. The Supreme Court acknowledged that "[t]he State's abil-
ity to assemble its case almost inevitably dwarfs the parents' ability .... 33
Children, who have no income of their own, cannot have a greater ability
than their parents to mount a case against the state.
Moreover, imposition of a rebuttable presumption would encourage
state agency workers to be more attentive in their choice of foster homes and
subsequent supervision of foster care placements. This would reduce abuse
suffered by foster children at the hands of their foster parents and would re-
sult in fewer lawsuits resulting from such abuse. Furthermore, if the state did
comply with the professional judgment standard, required case records
would reflect this and the assertion could easily be corroborated through
notes reflecting adequate home visits, foster parent training attendance re-
cords, and detailed documentation of the screening process. The state is in
the best position to access and maintain such records and this provides addi-
tional support for the imposition of the rebuttable presumption on the state
agency. The child's interest in safety does not conflict, but rather runs con-
137. Chou, supra note 14, at 686.
138. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 763 (1982).
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gruent, with the state's interest in protecting children and providing them
with a safe living environment.
Many policy reasons support placing the burden of proof on the state in
actions by children to protect their constitutional rights, and the requirement
of imposing the professional judgment standard. The Court needs to estab-
lish a unified standard, preferably professional judgment, to protect foster
children. These children do not have the protection of parents and are subject
to the diligence of the state child welfare agency to protect them. If the
agency fails to exercise professional judgment, the results could be devastat-
ing. Accordingly, the rule should be established that when the child sustains
injury or death from abuse or neglect of a foster parent, this triggers a rebut-
table presumption that the state agency violated the foster child's constitu-
tional fight to safety, thereby shifting the burden of proof onto the state to
prove that it did in fact exercise the appropriate professional judgment. The
goal of foster care is to take children from dangerous situations and place
them in protective custody. This proposal can only further efforts to achieve
that goal and improve the plight of children in the foster care system.
V. CONCLUSION
The perpetuation of conflict between the circuits obviates the need for
the Supreme Court to hear and rule on the issue of state liability for violation
of foster children's constitutional right to safety. The issue has been before
courts for at least twenty years and still exists. Foster children continue to be
subjected to abuse by their foster parents. Cases addressing this issue are
likely to increase proportionately with the annual increase of the number of
foster children if progressive steps are not taken to end this violence. Further
support for such a ruling may be found in DeShaney. The Court cited only
two cases recognizing foster children's fight to safety and cited no cases re-
futing such a right, possibly implying that the Court would rule in favor of a
child's right to safety if such a case were granted certiorari. However, the
Court declined to grant certiorari in cases denying foster children such a
cause of action and in cases acknowledging a constitutional cause of action
for right to safety; therefore, the issue remains unresolved.
Foster children deserve a forum that can address their constitutional
right to safety because foster children are in such vulnerable positions. They
do not have their parents to protect them and advocate for them. They do not
have the ability to change their living situation on their own initiative. Foster
children should have the same constitutional right to safe foster care regard-
less of the somewhat artificial distinction between voluntary and involuntary
placement. The standard that should be used in determining whether their
constitutional fight to safety was violated should be the professional judg-
ment standard because this standard merely requires that the state employees
perform their job attentively. Moreover, because foster children face an in-
credible burden in retaining legal counsel and asserting their rights, there
[Vol. 38
18
California Western Law Review, Vol. 38 [2001], No. 2, Art. 8
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwlr/vol38/iss2/8
2002] PROTECTING THOSE WHO CANNOT PROTECT THEMSELVES 525
should be a rebuttable presumption that the state failed to exercise profes-
sional judgment in the placement of the foster child when the foster child is
abused or neglected by his or her foster parents. The state is the party in the
best position to protect foster children. The Supreme Court must grant cer-
tiorari to a case addressing the issue of state liability for violation of a foster
child's right to safety. The Supreme Court needs to recognize that right and
enable foster children throughout the United States to enforce their fight to
safe foster care.
Four-year-old John Smith needed the state's help. The state purported to
be helping him when they removed him from his biological parents' home
and placed him in a foster home. But the help they gave John stopped there.
The state stood by and watched as John was injured over and over. In a sea-
son where many children John's age are exuberant and anxiously await the
arrival of Santa Claus, John Smith was in a hospital unconscious because of
the "help" the state gave him. He died on Christmas Eve, putting an end to
six months of torture he endured while in the care of his foster parents.'
Surely, the lives of John and the many other vulnerable foster children are
important enough for the Supreme Court to acknowledge and protect by
hearing the issue of a foster child's constitutional right to safety, which, up
to this point, the Court has so diligently avoided.
139. Maynard, supra note 1.
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